The lack of controllability of EVA explains its decline a field study

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Fishing for excuses and performance evaluation

We study a principal-agent model in which the agent can provide ex post additional relevant information regarding his performance. In particular, he can provide a legitimate excuse, that is, evidence that a poor result is only due to factors outside his control. However, building a convincing case requires time, time that is not spent on exerting productive eff ort, and thus generating information represents an opportunity cost. We obtain necessary and suffi cient conditions for the principal to prefer a policy of adjusting ex post the performance measure for the information provided by the agent to a policy of conforming to a result-based system with no adjustments. The risk aversion and a possible limited liability of the agent play an important role in the analysis. This paper clarifi es the issues asso- ciated with the so-called \excuse culture" prevailing in some organizations

Candidate gene prioritization using graph embedding

International audienceCandidate genes prioritization allows to rank among a large number of genes, those that are strongly associated with a phenotype or a disease. Due to the important amount of data that needs to be integrate and analyse, gene-to-phenotype association is still a challenging task. In this paper, we evaluated a knowledge graph approach combined with embedding methods to overcome these challenges. We first introduced a dataset of rice genes created from several open-access databases. Then, we used the Translating Embedding model and Convolution Knowledge Base model, to vectorize gene information. Finally, we evaluated the results using link prediction performance and vectors representation using some unsupervised learning techniques

L'EVA et la théorie des incitations : une étude de cas

Though EVAâ has become a text book reference as a performance measure, there remains much to be learned about the actual implementation of the corresponding compensation systems. EVA systems have two distinguishable features : the use of an external standard related to the financial market (as opposed to more traditional (budget) internal systems) and the fact that EVA concerns the managers of profit centers and not only the top executives. This paper investigates an actual implementation of an EVA system through a case study. This case study provides detailed information on how the performance measure has been cascaded down in the organization and how the standards were constructed. After two years of operations the actual bonus paid by the system are analyzed as well as some qualitative feed back from the managers involved. Based on this case study, and as opposed to the general claims put forward by its advocates, it is argued that EVA systems do not by-pass the traditional congruence controllability dilemma that ordinarily applies to all compensation systems in firms. This analysis is consistent with the empirical limitations of EVA systems as reported in the literature.Cet article analyse un système de compensation mis en œuvre dans une grande entreprise multinationale au niveau de ses centres de profit. Le système de compensation étudié est inspiré de l'EVAâ. Un tel système a deux caractéristiques importantes : il repose sur un standard externe relié au marché financier (par opposition à des systèmes internes basés sur des standards budgétaires), il est décomposable dans l'entreprise jusqu'à des niveaux assez fins correspondants à ses centres de profit. L'étude a porté sur la mise en place du système et sur les deux années qui ont suivi. Elle permet d'avoir des observations détaillées sur le calibrage du système, les résultats quantitatifs en termes de bonus et sur les réactions plus qualitatives des managers concernés. Contrairement aux allégations de ses protagonistes, cette étude de cas suggère que les systèmes EVA ne permettent pas de d'affranchir du dilemme congruence contrôle qui est une constante dans la plupart des systèmes de compensation. Cette remise en cause permet de rendre compte des limites rapportées dans la littérature concernant la mise en œuvre des systèmes EVA

The lack of controllability of EVA explains its decline a field study

This paper investigates the properties of EVA compensation schemes, which were considered as a major managerial innovation of the 90’s. The analysis is carried on in the framework of contract theory and based on a six year longitudinal case study. Such schemes induce highly volatile bonuses compared to more traditional ones. This is interpreted as a loss of controllability, where controllability is defined as the controllability of their performance measured by managers. The role of the target setting, based on external standards, and the absence of renegotiation are of particular significance in explaining this loss. This analysis explains the difficulties encountered in the implementation of these schemes and their relative decline

Environment factor, private information and the controllability principle

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